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I. Introduction 
In 1990 the Wisconsin Legislature enacted the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (“MPCP”).
1
 The first publicly funded voucher program of 
its type in the United States,
2
 the MPCP permitted up to one percent (1%) 
or approximately 1000 of the enrolled children in Milwaukee Public 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Education, Department of Educational Leadership and Policy 
Analysis, University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am grateful to the staff of the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice for their helpful comments and suggestions in 
the development of this article. 
 1. 1989 WISCONSIN ACT 336, § 228 (MAY 11, 1990). The current version of the law is 
codified at: WIS. STAT. §119.23 (2014). 
 2. School Vouchers, History, National Conference of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-choice-vouchers.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 
2015).  
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Schools (“MPS”) to attend private non-sectarian schools within the city’s 
limits if their family’s income was no more than 175% of the federal 
poverty level.
3
  Participating schools were limited to enrolling no more than 
49% of their overall student population by means of the voucher,
 4
 which 
provided approximately $2500 per student.
5
  
Not surprisingly, the program was extremely controversial and was 
soon challenged in state court.  When the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard 
Davis v. Grover
 6
 in 1992, seven schools and 341 children participated in 
the MPCP.
7
 The court entertained three allegations: (1) the law was invalid 
because the procedures used to enact it violated the state’s constitutional 
prohibition against “private” or “local” bills; (2) the law violated the state 
constitution’s education clause; and (3) the law violated the state’s public 
purpose doctrine.
8
 The court, splitting 4–3, upheld the program on all three 
counts.
9
 The majority’s reasoning repeatedly referenced the “experimental” 
nature of the program and the limits placed by the legislature on 
participation in support of the conclusion reached.
10
  
However, the “experimental” program analyzed in 1992 differs 
dramatically from that in operation now. The MPCP has been revised 
several times, each time expanding the scope of the program, both in terms 
of the schools and students eligible to participate.
11
 Both religious and non-
                                                                                                     
 3. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Wis. 1992). 
 4. Id. at 464. 
 5. Id. at 476 n.23. 
 6. 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).  As will be discussed further below, the program 
was later challenged and upheld on Establishment of Religion Clause grounds after the 
program was expanded to permit private religious schools to participate.  See infra Part III. 
 7. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE 
PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION 11 (Feb., 2000), available at http://legis.wisconsin. 
gov/lab/reports/00-2full.pdf. 
 8. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 462–63. 
 9. Id. at 477. 
 10. Id. at 474. 
 11. See infra Part II. The Wisconsin legislature has also created 2 additional voucher 
programs. First, the Racine Parental Choice Program (RPCP) for Racine, Wisconsin (Act 32 
(Wis. 2011)), began in the 2011-2012 school year. Data for 2014-2015 indicate that 15 
private schools and 1740 students participated in the program (WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. 
INSTRUCTION, RPCP FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2014-2015 (2014), available at 
http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/choice_facts_statistics). Next was a statewide voucher program (Act 
20 (Wis. 2013)). The statewide program (in locations other than Milwaukee and Racine) is 
limited to 1000 students in the 2014-2015 school year, and no more than 1% of any single 
school district’s membership thereafter (WIS. STAT. § 118.60(2)(be)). Data released by the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction indicate that 1013 students (997.5 full time 
equivalent students) and 31 private schools participated in the program this year (WIS. DEP’T 
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religious schools may now register as MPCP participating schools.
12
  There 
are no longer limits on the percentage of students a private school may 
enroll through the program
13
 and in fact the average MPCP school enrolls 
more than 80% of its students through vouchers.
14
 There are no longer 
limits on the total number of students from Milwaukee who may 
participate.
15
 The schools eligible to participate no longer must be 
physically located within the city of Milwaukee, but may be located 
anywhere in the state.
16
 Eligibility for low-income families has been 
expanded from 175% to 300% of the federal poverty level,
17
 an amount 
greater than the median household income for the state.
18
 As would be 
anticipated and as will be described more fully in sections to follow, 
participation in the program has grown steadily and as of November 2014 
includes 113 participating private schools that enroll a total of 26,930 
students and costs the state approximately $191,000,000.
19
 
The “experiment” has also yielded a variety of research reports 
throughout its history.
20
  A recent report suggests that children enrolled in 
                                                                                                     
OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, STATEWIDE VOUCHER ENROLLMENT COUNTS (OCTOBER 23, 2014), 
available at http://news.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/eis/pdf/dpinr2014_110.pdf).  Both 
programs are now codified at WIS. STAT. § 118.60. 
 12. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1)(b). 
 13. Limitations originally found in WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(b)(2) (1990) and repealed 
by 1995 Wis. Act 27, §4003 (July 28, 1995). 
 14. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the 
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., at 2 (May 23, 2011), available at 
http://issuu.com/sparty1216/docs/dpi_letter_to_jcf5.23.11. 
 15. 2011 Wis. Act. 32, § 2539 (June 30, 2011).  
 16. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a). 
 17. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1).  Therefore, to be eligible for participation in the 
MPCP for 2014-15, the family income must be no greater than $34,953 for a family of 1, 
$47,181 for a family of 2, $59,409 for a family of 3, and $71,637 for family of 4 (For each 
additional member add $12,228). WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, 2014-15 SCHOOL YEAR, 
THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, INFORMATION FOR PARENTS (2014), available 
at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/2014-15_mpcp_brochure.pdf.     
 18. United States Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Wisconsin (2014), 
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html (reporting that the median 
household income for Wisconsin is $52,627).  
 19. WISCONSIN DEP’T OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-15 
(November, 2014) available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/choice_facts_statistics [hereinafter 
MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-15]. 
 20. See e.g., John F. Witte, The Milwaukee Voucher Experiment, 20 EDUC. 
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 229 (December 21, 1998); JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET 
APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM (2001); 
Research Brief, 100 PUBL. POLICY FORUM 1, (Feb. 2012). For official reports completed by 
the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, see: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental 
334 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 331 (2015) 
MPCP schools do no better, and in some cases worse, than similarly 
situated MPS students.
21
 These results are particularly interesting since 
MPCP schools are not required to serve children with special needs (e.g. 
children with disabilities or children learning English) in the same manner 
as MPS schools.
22
 In fact, less than 2% of the children enrolled in MPCP 
schools have identifiable disabilities, in contrast to nearly 20% of MPS 
students identified with disabilities.
23
 
That difference in the proportion of children with disabilities served in 
the MPCP spawned the program’s most recent legal challenge. In June of 
2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Disability Rights 
Wisconsin (DRW) filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) alleging that the MPCP discriminates against children with 
disabilities.
24
 The complaint claimed that the state violates the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA)
25
 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
(Section 504)
26
 by implementing a program that is not accessible to all 
children, resulting in the effective segregation of children with disabilities 
                                                                                                     
Choice Program, Report 00-2 (Feb. 2000); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program (Sept. 2008); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program, Report 2 of 5 (Aug. 2009); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program, Report 3 of 5 (Aug. 2010); Test Score Data for Pupils in the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Report 4 of 5 (Aug. 2011); Test Score Data for Pupils 
in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Report 5 of 5 (Aug. 2012). For seven research 
reports conducted by the University of Arkansas, School Choice Demonstration Project, see 
http://www.uaedreform.org/category/department-of-education-reform/scdp/milwaukee-
evaluation/mpcp-final-reports/. 
 21. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, OVERALL MPS RESULTS HIGHER THAN CHOICE 
SCHOOLS ON STATEWIDE EXAMS 2 (2011), available at https://millermps.files.wordpress. 
com/2011/03/dpi-comparison-mps-voucher-wkce-testing.pdf. 
 22. See WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM & 
RACINE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS – 2015-16 SCHOOL 
YEAR, 4 (2015), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/sms/Choice/MPCP 
and RPCP FAQ 2015-16.pdf. 
 23. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 21, at 2. 
 24. Complaint at 3, ACLU v. Wisconsin,  U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 7, 2011). 
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/complaint_to_doj_re_milwaukee_voucher_ 
program_final.pdf. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of disability. It includes 5 titles. Title I: Employment 
Discrimination; Title II: Discrimination in Public Services; Title III: Discrimination in 
Public Accommodations; Title IV: Discrimination in Telecommunications; Title V: 
Miscellaneous Provisions.  Title II applies to programs created and operated by public 
entities: 42 U.S.C. §§12131-12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq. 
 26. 29 U.S.C. §794; 34 C.F.R. 104 et seq. Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of disability by any recipient of federal financial assistance. 
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in MPS.
27
 Moreover, they argued that in violation of the ADA and Section 
504, MPCP schools actively discourage from enrolling and routinely turn 
away children with disabilities who could be accommodated in their 
programs.
28
 Characterizing MPCP schools as “private in name only,” the 
organizations called on the Department of Justice to investigate the matter 
and ensure MPCP satisfies all non-discrimination requirements.
29
 
The expansion of the MPCP and the charges made regarding children 
with disabilities focus attention on the public/private distinction typically 
used to describe schools.
30
 The issues raised in the complaint to the 
Department of Justice in combination with the expansion of the program 
since its “experimental” start also suggest the need to re-examine the 
constitutional analysis from Davis v. Grover with regard to the Education 
Clause and Public Purpose Doctrine.
31
 Do the changes enacted by the state 
legislature that result in a large and growing voucher program continue to 
satisfy state constitutional mandates? If the program results in 
concentrations of children with disabilities in public schools, does it satisfy 
the non-discriminatory requirements of both state and federal law?  These 
questions have particular import not only for the MPCP but also for the two 
other voucher programs created by the Wisconsin legislature, the Racine 
Parental Choice Program and the Wisconsin Parental Choice Program.
32
 
Although this analysis concentrates on the MPCP, the issues examined have 
equal application to Wisconsin’s other voucher programs.
33
 
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to review the history of the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and to re-examine the program with 
respect to three legal issues: (1) does the MPCP operate free from 
discrimination on the basis of disability?; (2) does the MPCP comport with 
the state constitution’s education clause that requires the legislature to 
provide for district schools that are as nearly uniform as practicable?; and 
(3) does the MPCP comport with the public purpose doctrine? This analysis 
is divided into five parts. Part II reviews the statutory history of the MPCP. 
Part III describes current participation in the MPCP. In Part IV previous 
                                                                                                     
 27. Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24, at 3. 
 28. Id. at 4.  
 29. Id. at 27.  
 30. See id. 
 31. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 477. 
 32. Supra, note 11. 
 33. The analysis may also have some application in other states with voucher 
programs, including Indiana (IC 20-51-1 and IC 20-51-4), and Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 17:4011-4025), and Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.974-979). 
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judicial rulings and the pending ACLU/DRW allegations about the program 
are reviewed. Part V analyzes the three legal issues of concern and Part VI 
provides a concluding discussion. 
II.  A Brief Statutory History of the MPCP 
As noted above, the MPCP began in 1990 and was signed into law by 
then Governor Tommy Thompson.
34
 The law has been amended twenty 
times, with the most recent changes made in 2013.
35
 The law has also 
grown both in participation and scope.  The original law comprised only 9 
sections covering a little more than 1 page. The statute now numbers 15 
provisions
36
 and fills seven pages of Chapter 119. While the changes have 
expanded the program substantially, the Wisconsin legislature has also 
enacted increasing requirements for private schools’ participation. This 
section reviews the evolution of the current statute with respect to 5 issues: 
(1) student eligibility; (2) private school participation; (3) authority of the 
State Superintendent and Department of Public Instruction (DPI); 
(4) program evaluation; and (5) funding. 
Table 1 summarizes the changes made to provisions related to student 
eligibility. As illustrated, the MPCP initially defined low-income students 
as those whose families made no more than 1.75 times the federal poverty 
level.
37
 In 2005, that provision was amended to permit voucher students 
whose family income increased after admittance to remain in the private 
school, provided the family’s income did not exceed 2.2 times the poverty 
level.
38
 That limit on eligibility increased again in 2011,
39
 now defining any 
student as eligible if family income totals no more than 3.0 times the 
poverty level and permits an admitted student to remain in the program if 
                                                                                                     
 34. 1989 WISCONSIN ACT 336, § 228 (MAY 11, 1990). 
 35. The law was originally enacted by the legislature in 1989 Wisconsin Act 336. 
Amendments were adopted through: (1) 1993 Wisconsin Act 16, (2) 1995 Wisconsin Act 27; 
(3) 1995 Wisconsin Act 216; (4) 1997 Wisconsin Act 27; (5) 1997 Wisconsin Act 113; (6) 
1999 Wisconsin Act 9; (7) 2001 Wisconsin Act 16; (8) 2001 Wisconsin Act 105; (9) 2003 
Wisconsin Act 33; (10) 2003 Wisconsin Act 155; (11) 2005 Wisconsin Act 25; (12) 2005 
Wisconsin Act 125; (13) 2009 Wisconsin Act 28; (14) 2009 Wisconsin Act 96; (15) 2011 
Wisconsin Act 32; (16) 2011 Wisconsin Act 47; (17) 2013 Wisconsin Act 8; (18) 2013 
Wisconsin Act 20; (19) 2013 Wisconsin Act 237; (20) 2013 Wisconsin Act 256. 
 36. WIS. STAT. §§ 119.23(1), (2), (3), (3m), (4), (4m), (4r), (5), (6), (6m), (7), (8), (9), 
(10), (11). 
 37. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1) (1990).  
 38. 2005 Wis. Act 25, § 1895h (July 26, 2005). 
 39. 2011 Wis. Act 32, § 2536c (June 30, 2011). 
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family income increases thereafter.
40
 Similarly, the cap on the total number 
of vouchers available grew from 1% to 1.5% in 1993,
41
 to 15% in 1996,
42
 to 
22,500 students in 2006.
43
 Act 32 removed the cap entirely for the program 
beginning with the 2011-2012 school year.
44
 The law also initially set limits 
on students’ previous school experiences.
45
 Over time, those constraints, 
too, have all been removed. As such, any child residing in Milwaukee is 
eligible for a voucher, whether or not they have ever attended an MPS 
school.
46
 The practical effect of the provisions for enrollment eligibility is 
that the vouchers have always funded three types of students –those exiting 
MPS schools, those who are attending any school for the first time, and 





                                                                                                     
 40. Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)(1)(a). 
 41. 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 2300 (Aug. 11, 1993). 
 42. 1995 Wis. Act 216, § 54 (April 29, 1996). 
 43. 2005 Wis. Act 125, § 7 (March 25, 2006). 
 44. 2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2539, repealing 119.23(2)(b) which read: “No more than 
22,500 pupils . . . may attend private schools under this section.” 
 45. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(2) (1990) (“In the previous school year the pupil was 
enrolled in the school district operating under this chapter, was attending a private school 
under this section or was not enrolled in school.”). 
 46. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (2013). 
 47. This trend was replicated with Wisconsin’s newest voucher program. Of the 500 
seats available in the statewide program the first year of its operation in 2013-14, 72.9 % 
students previously attended a private school, 21.2% previously attended a public school; 
3.3% were entering school for the first time, 2.4% had been previously homeschooled, and 1 
student had attended school in another state in the previous school year. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. 
INSTRUCTION, WPCP FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2013-2014 (November 2013) available at 
http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/wpcp_fact-and-figures_13-14_2013_10.pdf. 
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Table 1: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning Student Eligibility 
Original 
Requirement 
Changes and Year of Change 
Family income 
does not exceed 
1.75 times the 
federal poverty 
level 
If family income 
increases after 
admittance, child & 
siblings remain eligible 
if income is below 2.2 
times the federal 
poverty level (2005) 
Raised to 3.0 times 
the federal poverty 
level and permits 
remaining in the 




Resides in the city 
and previous year 
and attended MPS, 
the participating 
private school, or 
was not enrolled 
Added children 
enrolled in grades K-3 
in any private school in 
the city regardless of 
MPCP participation 
(1995) 
Repealed  (result is 





Total cap set at 1% 
of MPS enrollment  
Increased to 1.5% 
(1993). 
Increased to 7% for 
1995-96 and 15% 
for 1996-97 (1995). 






An examination of MPCP provisions governing private school 
participation reveals two important trends. First, the number of schools 
permitted to participate and the scope of that participation has increased. 
Schools initially had to be both non-sectarian and located within Milwaukee 
city limits.
48
 The legislature removed the first limitation in 1995 when it 
expanded to include religious schools
49
 and the second in 2011 when it 
permitted any private school to participate, opening the program to 
suburban private schools.
50
 Another major expansion involves limitations 
on the total number of voucher students any school could enroll. The 
program initially required that each participating school be more privately, 
than publicly funded by limiting total enrollment to 49% of the student 
population.
51
 That percentage increased to 65% in 1993
52
 and was removed 
entirely with the MPCP’s expansion to include religious schools in 1995.
53
 
Finally, beginning with the 2011-2012 school year, participating schools 
were granted the authority to charge reasonable fees (e.g., book fees, lab 
                                                                                                     
 48. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (1990). 
 49. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4002 (July 28, 1995). 
 50. 2011 Wis. Act 32, § 2536 (June 30, 2011). 
 51. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(b)(2) (1990). 
 52. 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 2300 (Aug. 11, 1993). 
 53. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4003 (July 28, 1995). 
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fees) and tuition over and above the voucher amount.
54
 The latter authority 
only applies to high schools and only if the family makes more than 2.2 
times the federal poverty limit.
55
  
A second trend involves the growth in the number of conditions 
schools must agree to in order to participate in the program. Initially, the 
schools had to commit to very little.
56
 They could not discriminate on the 
basis of race,
57
 had to meet health and safety codes that apply to public 
schools,
58
 and they had to meet their choice of one of 4 standards, which 
included: 
1) At 70% of the pupils in the program advance one grade 
level each year. 
2) The private school’s average attendance rate for the 
pupils in the program at least 90%. 
3) At least 80% of the pupils in the program demonstrate 
significant academic progress. 
4) At least 70% of the families of the pupils in the 




These requirements remain in the current law, but the legislature has 
increased conditions of participation several times in the twenty years of 
program operation. The first new regulation was added in 1995 and 
required schools to submit to financial audits.
60
 Then, following some 
highly publicized problems with some participating schools,
61
 the 
legislature created several more conditions of participation in 2004 and 
granted DPI some direct regulatory authority it had previously lacked.  New 
provisions added in 2004: 
                                                                                                     
 54. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(3m)(2014). 
 55. Id. 
 56. As discussed infra at note 121 and accompanying text, the Wisconsin DPI 
attempted to regulate the program more fully, but those regulations were struck down in 
Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). 
 57. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(4).  
 58. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(5). 
 59. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(7)(a). 
 60. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4007r (July 29, 1995). 
 61. See e.g., Voucher School Owes State $330K; Teachers Gripe Over Pay, CAPITAL 
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2003), at 12C; State Has Few Options with School, CAPITAL TIMES (Sept. 
15, 2003), at 5A; Sarah Carr, 2 Schools of Thought Clash on Voucher Plan Controls, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 12, 2003), at A1; Sarah Carr and Nahal Toosi, Voucher 
School May Be in Financial Trouble, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 12, 2003), at B1. 
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 Required participating private schools to provide a 
certificate of occupancy in advance or participation.
62
 
 Gave the State Superintendent the authority to 
immediately terminate participation of school if there 
was imminent harm to health and safety of children.
63
 
 Required financial audits to meet standards.64 
 Required participating private schools to provide proof 
of financial viability,
65
 sound fiscal practices,
66
 and that 




The legislature increased regulatory control again in 2005 and 2006, adding 
provisions more directly related to instructional quality, requiring that:  








 Schools administer nationally normed tests in reading, 






 grades and submit 
results to the School Choice Demonstration Project at 
the University of Arkansas.
70
 The Legislative Audit 
                                                                                                     
 62. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 4 (March 31, 2004). 
 63. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 5 (March 31, 2004). 
 64. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 1 (March 31, 2004). 
 65. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 4 (March 31, 2004). 
 66. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 2 (March 31, 2004). 
 67. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 4 (March 31, 2004). 
 68. 2005 Wis. Act 25 § 1895t (July 26, 2005). 
 69. 2005 Wis. Act 125 § 6 (March 25, 2006). Those organizations were: Institute for 
the Transformation of Learning at Marquette University, the Wisconsin North Central 
Association, the Wisconsin Religious and Independent Schools Accreditation, the 
Independent Schools Association of the Central States, and the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. 
In 2013, the law was amended to omit the Institute for the Transformation of Learning at 
Marquette University, substitute “the diocese or archdiocese within which the private school 
is located” for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, and add the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran 
Synod School Accreditation, the National Lutheran School Accreditation, and the Wisconsin 
Association of Christian Schools to the list of acceptable accrediting entities. 2013 Wis. Act 
20, § 1872m, codified at WIS. STAT. § 119.23(7)(ad). 
 70. 2005 Wis. Act 125 § 8 (March 25, 2006).  The reports by the School Choice 
Demonstration project may be found at: http://www.uaedreform.org/category/department-of-
education-reform/scdp/milwaukee-evaluation/mpcp-final-reports/ 
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The trend to hold schools further accountable for instructional quality 
continued with new provisions in 2009. The most significant of these 
provisions required MPCP schools to adopt the academic standards in 
mathematics, science, reading, writing, geography and history
72
 and 
participate in the state achievement testing for the first time in program 
history.
73
 Provisions also now require teachers and administrators to hold at 
least a bachelor’s degree
74
 and teacher’s aides to be high school graduates.
75
 
The most recent changes require participating schools to participate in the 
state’s student information system.
76
 Table A1 in Appendix A summarizes 
these changes to private school participation and their relationship to the 
original provisions. 
Not surprisingly, as the legislature set more conditions for school 
participation, it likewise increased the authority of the State Superintendent 
and the Department of Public Instruction
77
 to take action if the school failed 
                                                                                                     
 71. 2005 Wis. Act 125 § 8 (March 25, 2006).  For the official reports completed by the 
Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, see: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program, Report 00-2 (Feb. 2000); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (Sept. 2008); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program, Report 2 of 5 (Aug. 2009); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program, Report 3 of 5 (August 2010); Test Score Data for Pupils in the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program, Report 4 of 5 (Aug. 2011); Test Score Data for Pupils in the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Report 5 of 5 (Aug. 2012).  
 72. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2289 (July 1, 2009). The provision incorporates WIS. STAT. 
§ 118.30(1g)(a)(3) which reads: “The governing body of each private school participating in 
the program under s. 119.23 shall adopt pupil academic standards in mathematics, science, 
reading and writing, geography, and history. The governing body of the private school may 
adopt the pupil academic standards issued by the governor as executive order no. 326, dated 
January 13, 1998.” 
 73. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2290 (July 1, 2009); amended slightly by 2013 Wis. Act 20 
§ 1874 (June 30, 2013). The provision, now codified at WIS. STAT. § 119.23(7)(e), 
incorporates WIS. STAT. § 118.30 (1s) which requires MPCP schools to administer tests 
adopted or approved by the state superintendent in 4th, 8th, 9th, and 10th grades.   
 74. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2278d (July 1, 2009). 
 75. 2009 Wis. Act 28 § 2289. 
 76. 2013 Wis. Act 256 §7 (April 9, 2014). 
 77. Wisconsin’s State Superintendent of Public Instruction is a constitutional officer 
and elected in a statewide election for a 4-year term (Wis. Const. Article X, Section 1). This 
structure led to a situation in both Davis v. Grover  (supra note 6) and Jackson v. Benson 
(infra note 143 and accompanying text) where the state superintendent and governor stood 
on different sides of the disputes about the program. For a discussion of this political 
division, see e.g. Julie Underwood, Choice in Education: The Wisconsin Experience, 68 
EDUC. L. REP. 229, 235 (1991). 
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to meet program requirements. While the statute does not grant the 
authority to bar a school for poor academic performance generally
78
 or to 
assert oversight in a manner consistent with the authority over public 
schools, the revisions have strengthened state oversight as shown in Table 
2. The agency can withhold funds from schools under some conditions
79
 
and can require a number of assurances regarding the facility and 
curriculum in order to approve participation.
80
 While the school has to 
provide the information to the agency, the DPI does not have the authority 
to approve that curriculum or direct a participating school to add to or omit 
anything from its course of study.
81
 The DPI may only take immediate 
action terminating a school’s authorization to participate in the program if it 
is determined “that conditions at the private school present an imminent 




                                                                                                     
 78. See, for example, a recent report of an MPCP school that closed precipitously in 
December 2013, leaving 66 students without an academic home. Newspaper accounts report 
“John Johnson, DPI spokesman, said Wednesday that the department's authority over 
voucher schools, which are all private and predominantly religious, is limited. There's 
nothing in state law that allows the DPI to take action against a private school because of 
low academic performance or because of a school leader's personal finances, Johnson said.” 
Erin Richards, Leaders of Closed Milwaukee Voucher School are now in Florida, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 15, 2014).  The statute does allow the superintendent to deny 
participation to a school that fails to achieve or has lost its accreditation for the school year 
following the loss (WIS. STAT. §119.23(10)(ar)). 
 79. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(10)(d). Those conditions are: (1) Misrepresented required 
information; (2) Failed to provide the notice or pay the fee required; (3) Failed to refund to 
the state any overpayment; (4) Failed to meet at least one of the required  academic 
standards; (5) Failed to provide the information to parents; (6) Failed to adopt appropriate 
academic standards or excuse a student from religious activities at parental request; 
(7) Failed to keep student records, provide the same to parents, or issue a diploma or 
certificate for graduating students; (8) hired a person disqualified by the state superintendent 
for improper previous conduct. 
 80. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(6m)(b). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 2003 Wis. Act 155 § 5 (Mar. 31, 2004) (codified at WIS. STAT. § 119.23(10)(b)). 
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Table 2: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning DPI Responsibilities 
and Authority 
Original  requirement Changes and year of change 
Provide information to 
parents about program 





but original provision 
retained (1995) 
State Superintendent 
monitor performance in 
relation to 4 standards 
Repealed and replaced by 
authority to bar 
participation or withhold 
funds if application to 
participate misrepresented 
information, failed to 
provide requisite 
assurances by statutory 
date, or failed to meet 1 of 
4 standards. (2004) 




 Revoke participation 
immediately if imminent 
threat to students’ health or 
safety. (2004)  
 
 Revoke authorization to 
participate at end of school 




Provisions requiring program evaluation tell an interesting story. The 
original law included provisions for programmatic evaluation, including a 
comparison between the performance of students in MPCP schools and 
those similarly situated in MPS schools.
83
 Those original evaluative 
components were removed when the program expanded to include religious 
schools.
84
 Given the likelihood of a constitutional challenge under the 
Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, it appears that 
                                                                                                     
 83. 1989 Act 336 § 228, (May 11, 1990) (codified at WIS. STAT. 
§ 119.23(5)(d)(1990)). The provision directed the state superintendent to “Annually submit 
to the chief clerk of each house of the legislature for distribution to the appropriate standing 
committees under s. 13.172(3), and to each private school participating in the program under 
this section, a report comparing the academic achievement, daily attendance record, 
percentage of dropouts, percentage of pupils suspended and expelled and parental 
involvement activities of pupils attending a private school under this section and pupils 
enrolled in the school district operating under this chapter.” 
 84. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4007m (July 28, 1995). 
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the legislature removed provisions that could make the program vulnerable 
to claims of “excessive entanglement” between government and religion 
under an application of the analysis from Lemon v. Kurtzman.
85
 After the 
program survived that scrutiny by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1998
86
 
and the U.S. Supreme Court likewise upheld a similar Cleveland program 
in 2002,
87
 the legislature again instituted an evaluation component in 
2006.
88
 The provision called for testing and data collection to be analyzed 
by the School Choice Demonstration Project at the University of Arkansas 
and audited by the Legislative Audit Bureau, with comparative reports due 
annually from 2007-2011.
89
 Now that those evaluations are complete, the 
law has no active evaluation provision.
90
 
Table 3: Changes to MPCP Provisions Concerning Evaluation of the 
Program 
Original  requirement Changes and year of change 
State superintendent: Submit 
an annual report comparing 
MPCP schools to MPS 
schools on academic 
achievement, daily 
attendance, dropout rate, 
suspension and expulsion 
data, & parental involvement 
Repealed (1995)  
State superintendent may 
conduct financial or 
performance evaluations 
Repealed (1995)  
Legislative audit bureau 
perform an audit by 1/15/95. 
Perform audit by 
1/15/2000 (1995) 
Repealed since audits completed 
(2001) 
 Legislative audit 
bureau must 
review results of 
School Choice 
Demonstration 
Repealed evaluation and 
legislative audit provision (2013) 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The “Lemon Test” 
requires that any state action (1) serve a legitimate secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect 
which neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoids excessive entanglement between 
government and religion. 
 86. Jackson v. Benson, N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). 
 87. Zelman v. Simmons Harris, 536 U.S. 739 (2002). 
 88. 2005 Wis. Act 125, § 8 (March 25, 2006). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See 2013 Wis. Act 8, § 38 (March 28, 2013) (repealing the requirement that data 
be provided for evaluation). 




Finally, the funding of the vouchers has changed over time. Initially 
the MPCP vouchers were funded with the tax dollars that would have gone 
to MPS instead going to the private participating school.
91
 Since then a 
complex formula has evolved that shares costs for the program between 
MPS and general state revenues. A thorough discussion of the funding 
mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say here that a 
maximum voucher amount ($7,210 for elementary students and $7,856 for 
2014-2015) is set by statute,
92
 and the voucher must not exceed actual 
educational costs spent by a school.
93
 Program costs are currently shared 
statewide and “[b]eginning in the 2013-14 school year, the previous 38.4% 
aid reduction to MPS will be reduced by 3.2 percentage points per year 
until the program is fully funded by state general purpose revenue. In the 
2014-15 school year the MPCP is funded 32% from a reduction in state 
general aid to MPS ($61,120,000 in 2014-15) and 68% from state general 
purpose revenue ($129,880,000 in 2014-15).”
94
 Table 4 chronicles those 
changes over time. 
Two other funding changes should also be noted. First, in 1999, the 
program expanded to permit vouchers for summer programming.
95
 
Secondly, the manner in which DPI pays participating schools has come 
full circle. Originally, each calendar quarter DPI cut a check for each 
participating school in an amount equal to the number of participating 
students multiplied by 25% of the voucher amount.
96
 When the program 
expanded to permit religious schools, the statute changed this practice to 
direct the funds to the parents by means of a restrictively endorsed check.
97
 
So rather than one check per participating school, the state provided one 
check per child, per quarter. The checks were mailed to the schools, but 
                                                                                                     
 91. WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (5)(a)(1990). 
 92. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(4)(bg). Beginning in 2015-16, the voucher amount will be 
determined by a formula.  
 93. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(4)(bg)(3). Participating schools are also permitted to recoup 
debt service costs associated with educational programming. 
 94. MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-15, supra note 19. 
 95. 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 2109q (Oct. 29, 1999). 
 96. 1989 Act 336, § 228, (May 11, 1990) (codified at Wis. Stat. § 119.23(4)(1990)). 
 97. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4006m (July 29, 1995). 
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made out to the parents and parents had to endorse them over to the 
schools.
98
 This change was made in order to avoid invalidation under the 
Establishment Clause as a direct payment to religious schools.
99
 The 2011 
revisions to the law returned the procedure to the original process.
100
 




Changes and Year of Change 
Voucher equals 
equivalent per 
pupil state aid 
Voucher equals 
equivalent per 
pupil state aid or 
private school 
operating budget 
and debt service 
per pupil 
whichever is less 
(1995) 
Set maximum 
voucher amount to 
$6,442 (2009). 







and debt service 
(2011). 
Set maximum 
voucher to $7210 
(elementary) & 
$7856 (high 
school) for the 
2014-15 
academic year) 





MPS state aid 





MPS pay for 45% 
of voucher with 







proportion paid by 
MPS and 
























to the school on 
behalf of the 
parent; single 
payment for each 
school (2011). 
  
 Added summer 
school voucher 
(1999) 
   
                                                                                                     
 98. Id.  
 99. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (Wis. 1998). 
 100. 2011 Wis. Act 32, §§ 2541m, 2542, 2542c (July 1, 2011) (codified at WIS. STAT. 
§ 119.23 (4)(c)). 
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III.  Current MPCP Participation 
As would be anticipated given the statutory expansions reviewed in the 
previous section, participation has increased steadily since the program’s 
inception. The first year of the MPCP saw 7 participating schools enrolling 
300 students.
101
 After Davis was decided in 1992, participation increased to 
11 schools and a total of 594 students.
102
 The school year (1998-99) after 
the Supreme Court’s ruling upholding the program on Establishment Clause 
grounds
103
 saw the most dramatic increase, from 23 to 83 schools and from 
1487 to 5761 students.
104
 During the 2010-2011 school year,
105
 20,996 
students attended 102 participating private schools.
106
 Not surprisingly, with 
the cap removed, the 2011-2012 school year saw the largest increase in 
participation since 2006.
107
 As mentioned earlier, the MPCP now funds 
nearly 27,000 students who attend 113 private schools.
108
 As the Public 
Policy Forum pointed out, “[i]f MPCP were a Wisconsin public school 




MPCP schools vary with regard to the number of voucher students 
each accepts, but the program has evolved such that the majority of schools 
rely heavily on the vouchers for operational funding.  Analysis of the 
enrollment data for 2012-2013 reported by the Public Policy Forum,
110
 an 
organization that tracks MPCP participation, documents that on the average 
participating MPCP schools enroll 82% of their student body by means of a 
voucher. That percentage increases to 87% if you examine those schools 
                                                                                                     
 101. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU. MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE 
PROGRAM, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 28, at 9, (January, 2011). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618. 
 104. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, supra note 101. 
 105. For 2010-11, the MPCP still had a limitation on the number of students who could 
participate (22,500), defined eligibility as 175% of the poverty level, and restricted 
participating schools to those within the city’s limits. WIS. STAT. 119.23(2)(b)(2009). 
 106. Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, MPCP Facts and Figures for 2010-2011 
(November, 2013), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sms_geninfo. 
 107. Anneliese Dickman & Jeffrey Schmidt, Research Brief: Significant Growth in 
School Choice  100:1 PUBLIC POLICY FORUM 1–12 (February 2012), available at 
http://publicpolicyforum.org/sites/default/files/2012voucherbrief.pdf. 
 108. MPCP Facts and Figures for 2014-2015, supra note 19. 
 109. Dickman & Schmidt, supra note 107, at 3. 
 110. See Milwaukee Voucher Schools 2012-2013, PUBLIC POLICY FORUM (Feb. 2013), 
available at http://publicpolicyforum.org/sites/default/files/2013VoucherPoster.pdf. For a 
report on the previous year’s enrollment, see Dickman & Schmidt, supra note 107, at 9. 
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within Milwaukee’s city limits
111
 and if you omit the only two Milwaukee 
schools with less than 10% voucher enrollment,
112
 the average MPCP 
enrollment increases to 88.6%.
113
 Table 5 presents an analysis of schools’ 
enrollment with respect to the proportion admitted through the MPCP. 




% of MPCP 
students in total 
school population 




% of total 
participating 
schools 
# of MPCP 
participating 
private schools in 
city of Milwaukee 
% of total 
participating 
schools in city of 
Milwaukee 
Schools w/o data to 
compute 
3 2.7% 1 1.0% 
0 – 9.9% 8 7.1% 2 2.0% 
10 – 19.9% 1 .9% 1 1.0% 
20 – 29.9% 2 1.8% 0 0.0% 
30 – 39.9% 1 .9% 1 1.0% 
40 – 49.9% 4 3.5% 4 3.9% 
50 – 59.9% 4 3.5% 4 3.9% 
60 – 69.9% 3 2.7% 3 2.9% 
70 – 79.9% 6 5.3% 5 4.9% 
80 – 89.9% 13 11.5% 13 12.7% 
90 – 99.9% 50 44.2% 50 49.0% 
100% 18 15.9% 18 17.6% 
Total 113 100.0% 102 100.0% 
As shown, 50 schools (44.2%) had 90–99.9% MPCP enrollment and 
18 schools (15.9%) had 100% MPCP enrollment. Only 16 schools (14.2%) 
had less than 50% MPCP enrollment.  Figure 1 presents the same data, but 
divides the schools into quintiles depending on enrollment.  As this graphic 
shows, nearly three-fourths of MPCP participating schools (71.7%) had 
80% or greater voucher enrollment. 
                                                                                                     
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. Marquette University High School (4.6%) and Divine Savior Holy Angels 
High School (8.4%).  
 113. See Id. 
 114. This table was compiled by analyzing the data reported by Public Policy Forum 
(supra note 110). 
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This pattern of publicly funded enrollment prompted State 
Superintendent Tony Evers to remark, “This government subsidy has 
protected Milwaukee private schools from the market forces that have led 
to declining private enrollment statewide.”
115
 After reviewing the data in 
the letter to the state legislature’s Joint Committee on Finance, Evers also 
posed the following question: “If only one in five students enrolled in a 
choice school pays tuition, then when do choice schools stop being private 
schools and become something else?”
116
 
Superintendent Evers also reported on another enrollment trend he 
called “concerning,” the relative number of children with disabilities 
enrolled in the MPCP schools when compared to those of MPS.
117
 He 
reported data that children with disabilities comprised only .7% of MPCP 
schools enrollments, while children with disabilities were about 19.9% of 
MPS enrollment.
118
 Another more recent DPI document places the 
proportion of children with disabilities in MPCP schools at a slightly higher 
level (2%).
119
 In addition, the DPI reports that percentage of MPS students 
with disabilities has steadily increased over the years, even though the 
number of students with disabilities in the public system has remained 
                                                                                                     
 115. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the 
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., supra note 14, at 2. 
 116. Id. at 5. 
 117. Id. at 2. 
 118. Id. 
 119. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 21. 
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stable.
120
 In other words, MPS has lost “regular” education students to the 
MPCP, but not “special” education students.   
IV.  Legal Challenges to the MPCP 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has heard challenges to the MPCP 
twice. The first challenge, Davis v. Grover, began when then State 
Superintendent Bert Grover promulgated a series of regulations plaintiffs 
believed exceeded his authority under the original MPCP.
121
 School 
administrator and civil rights groups then intervened to challenge the 
constitutionality of the program.
122
 Interestingly, one area of contention at 
the trial court level was the MPCP’s treatment of children with disabilities. 
Superintendent Grover had created a rule that would have required MPCP 
schools to serve children with disabilities in a manner similar to public 
schools, effectively making what was then the Education for All 
Handicapped Children’s Act
123
 applicable to the MPCP schools.
124
 Judge 
Steingass rejected that argument
125
 largely deferring to a memo written by 
                                                                                                     
 120. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the 
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., supra note 14. 
 121. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 464-65 (Wis. 1992). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.; 34 
C.F.R. 300 et seq.  The IDEA provides federal funds for the purpose of funding special 
education and related services (20 U.S.C. §1400(d)). It is a highly prescriptive law that 
mandates that states ensure that each eligible child with a disability have available a free 
appropriate public education (20 U.S.C. §1412(a)). Special education is defined as “specially 
designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a 
disability” (20 U.S.C. §1401(29)). Related services “means transportation, and such 
developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech-language 
pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services, physical and 
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, 
school nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free 
appropriate public education as described in the individualized education program of the 
child, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility 
services, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and 
evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit 
from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling 
conditions in children” (20 U.S.C. §1401(26)). For a full explanation of the legal 
requirements for IDEA, see e.g., DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER AND CYNTHIA M. HERR, NAVIGATING 
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY (2012). 
 124. See Julie Underwood, Choice in Education:  The Wisconsin Experience, 68 EDUC. 
L. REP. 229, 237 (1991). 
 125. Davis  v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990).  
PRIVATE IN NAME ONLY 351 
Richard D. Komer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Office for 
Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education.
126
 Komer concluded that 
since the participating schools were private, they could only be required to 
make reasonable accommodations to enroll children with disabilities.
127
 
Although the case advanced to the appellate court on the other issues, the 
ruling with respect to children with disabilities was never appealed.
128
 
The heart of the complaint in Davis v. Grover was its consideration of 
three constitutional issues: (1) whether the bill had been enacted according 
to constitutionally required procedures that prohibit the legislature from 
passing “private” or “local” bills;
129
 (2) whether the program violated the 
uniformity clause of the state constitution’s education provision;
130
 and 
(3) whether the law comported with the public purpose doctrine.
131
 Judge 
Steingass found the law constitutional on all three counts.
132
 The Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding that the MPCP was a local bill in contravention 
of the state constitution.
133
 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Callow wrote for a 
four-person majority.
134
 First the court determined that the MPCP, as an 
educational experiment, had sufficient statewide application that it should 
not be considered a local or private bill and therefore reversed the appellate 
court on that issue.
135
  
Next the court analyzed the program under the state constitution’s 
education clause. That clause reads as follows: 
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district 
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such 
                                                                                                     
 126. Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Policy in the 
Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Ted Sanders, Under Sec’y to the Dep’t 
of Education, (July 27, 1990). 
 127. Id. For a discussion, see Julie F. Mead, Including Students with Disabilities in 
Parental Choice Programs:  The Challenge of Meaningful Choice, 100 EDUC. L. REP. 463, 
476 (1995). 
 128. See Davis  v. Grover, 464 N.W. 2d 220, 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 129. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 18. 
 130. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
 131. See State ex rel. Warren v. Rueter, 170 N.W. 2d 790 (1969). 
 132. Davis, supra note 128. 
 133. Id. at 220. 
 134. Justices Callow, Ceci, Day, and Steinmetz formed the majority. Chief Justice 
Heffernan, and Justices Abrahamson and Bablitch dissented. 
 135. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 471 (Wis. 1992).  
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schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children 
between the ages of 4 and 20 years.
136
 
The court read this mandate to compel the legislature to create “district 
schools,” but ruled that the private schools participating in the MPCP did 
not become “district schools” merely because they received public funding. 
The court reasoned that “[t]he uniformity clause clearly was intended to 
assure certain minimal educational opportunities for the children of 
Wisconsin.”
137
 The MPCP, the court reasoned “merely reflects a legislative 
desire to do more than that which is constitutionally mandated” and that the 
legislature’s “experimental attempts to improve that foundation in no way 




Similarly, the court held that the MPCP satisfied the public purpose 
doctrine. That doctrine is not enshrined in Wisconsin’s constitution, but the 
“court has long held that public expenditures may be only for public 
purposes.”
139
 Challengers had argued that the state did not have sufficient 
control over MPCP schools to ensure that the funds adequately served a 
public purpose. In this instance, the court determined that education was a 
valid public purpose and that private schools could further that purpose. 
The court noted that the state already set minimum standards that statutorily 
defined “private school” in Wisconsin, including requirements that the 
school: 
(1) be organized to primarily provide private or religious-
based education; 
(2) be privately controlled; 
(3) provide at least 875 hours of instruction each school 
year; 
(4) provide a sequentially progressive curriculum of 
fundamental instructions in reading, language arts, 
mathematics, social studies, science, and health; 
(5) not be operated or instituted for the purpose of 
avoiding or circumventing compulsory school 
attendance; and 
                                                                                                     
 136. WIS. CONST. art. X § 3.  
 137. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474. 
 138. Id.  For a discussion of voucher programs and state constitutional provisions, see 
Preston Green and Peter Moran, The State Constitutionality of Voucher Programs:  Religion 
Is Not the Sole Determinant, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 275 (2010). 
 139. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474. 
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(6) have pupils return home not less than two months of 




The court concluded that those requirements “coupled with parental 
involvement suffice to ensure the public purpose is met.”
141
 The court also 
noted that the statutory requirement for “detailed reports and evaluations” 
worked to guarantee the program served a public purpose.
142
 
Six years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court would re-examine the 
MPCP and its relationship to both the Uniformity Clause and public 
purpose doctrine in Jackson v. Benson.
143
 Jackson is best known for the 
court’s analysis of the Establishment of Religion Clause issues raised by the 
legislature’s removal of the requirement that MPCP schools be non-
sectarian.
144
 In addition to upholding the law on state
145
 and federal 
religious claims,
146
 Jackson also considered whether changes enacted to the 
law placed it out of compliance with the other state constitutional 
mandates.
147
 Opponents had argued that the removal of the cap on the 
number of students a given school could enroll under the voucher would 
allow a school to be supported entirely by public funds, thus making it a 
public, not a private school.  The court rejected this argument, finding the 
proportion of voucher students enrolled in a school irrelevant to 
determining whether it was a private school. The majority held that “mere 
appropriation of public monies to a private school does not transform that 
school into a district school under art. X, § 3” and that “[t]his conclusion is 
not affected by the amount of public funds a private school receives.”
148
  
Likewise, the court re-affirmed the program’s compliance with the 
public purpose doctrine.
149
 Challengers argued that the removal of the 
evaluative components of the law so weakened the accountability 
provisions that the MPCP no longer sufficiently satisfied a public purpose. 
                                                                                                     
 140. Id. at 475, citing WIS. STAT. § 118.165 (1992). 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 476. 
 143. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). The court split 4-2 in reaching 
its decision. Justices Steinmetz, Wilcox, Crooks, and Prosser formed the majority. Chief 
Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch dissented. Justice Bradley did not participate. 
 144. Id. at 607. 
 145. Id. at 623. 
 146. Id. at 620. 
 147. Id. at 607. 
 148. Id. at 627. 
 149. Id. at 630. 
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The court rejected this reasoning and listed three ways the program 
remained accountable to the public: (1) MPCP schools “continue to be 
subject to the instruction, curriculum, and attendance regulations that 
govern all private schools”; (2) the statute still required financial audits and 
a further review by the Legislative Audit Bureau; and (3) “the schools 
participating in the amended MPCP are also subject to the additional checks 
inherent in the notion of school choice.”
150
 
As noted in the introduction, the most recent legal challenge to the 
MPCP was filed on June 7, 2011, even before the legislature enacted 
expansions to the program that same year.
151
 That challenge renewed 
concerns that the MPCP does not adequately serve students with 
disabilities.
152
 Complainants alleged that participating private schools 
actively turn away students with disabilities they could serve with minor 
accommodations to existing programs
153
 in violation of the non-
discrimination mandates of both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
154
 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
155
 They asserted that MPCP 
schools are “recipients” of federal funds and therefore are directly 
responsible under Section 504 for compliance, rather than as indirect 
recipients of monies that flow to the state.
156
 Moreover, they maintained 
that “the growth of the voucher program combined with the exclusion of 
students with disabilities from that program has led to an increasing 
concentration of students with disabilities in MPS,” effectively segregating 
children with disabilities in MPS schools.
157
 Referencing the concerns 
raised by State Superintendent Evers, they pointed to the difference 
between the percentage of students with disabilities served in MPCP 
schools (1.6%) and the MPS schools (19.5%).
158
 While the complaint takes 
aim at private schools for not doing enough to accommodate enrolled 
children with disabilities,
159
 the complaint predominantly focused on the 
                                                                                                     
 150. Id. at 629–630. 
 151. 2011 Wis. Act 32 (June 26, 2011). 
 152. Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24. 
 153. Id. at 5. 
 154. 29 U.S.C. §794; 34 C.F.R. 104 et seq. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. §§12131–12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq. 
 156. Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24, 
 at 3. 
 157. Id. at 10. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Two MPCP schools are named respondents in the complaint: Messmer Preparatory 
Catholic School and Concordia University School. Id. at 1. 
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state legislature and its development of the program, accusing the state of 
violating the federal non-discrimination acts by not taking affirmative 
action to ensure the voucher program operates in a non-discriminatory 
manner with respect to children with disabilities.
160
 They also alleged that 
the Department of Public Instruction has not provided sufficient oversight 
to ensure that the MPCP schools comply with their non-discrimination 
obligations.
161
 Once again, the complaint raised the issues of whether 
MPCP schools are private or public, declaring “[t]he voucher schools ought 
to be treated like public schools given the nature of their funding from the 
state [and] [a]s such they ought to accept IDEA-eligible students and 
provide them with appropriate services, at the same rate as public 
schools.”
162
 The complaint requested that the DOJ: 
 fully investigate [the] claims [made in the complaint]; 
 ensure that the voucher program ceases operating in a 
way the leads to segregation of Milwaukee students 
with disabilities in MPS; 
 ensure that DPI monitors the schools participating in 
the voucher program to ensure that students with 
disabilities are given equal access; 
 halt the expansion of the voucher program unless and 
until the segregation and discrimination issues are 
remedied; and 
 grant any other relief it deems just and proper.163 
The Department of Justice began its investigation by requesting 
information from the DPI and other respondents.
164
 While the private 
school responses to DOJ requests are not publicly available, the DPI made 
its responses to the DOJ’s inquiries public.
165
 Those responses sketched out 
DPI’s position that the MPCP is funded with state funds only and that no 
federal education dollars flow to the participating schools.
166
 DPI 
acknowledged that some MPCP schools participate in the National School 
                                                                                                     
 160. Id. at 22–27. 
 161. Id. at 4. 
 162. Id. at 28. 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. to the Wis. Dep’t of Pub. 
Instruction, Aug. 17, 2011. 
 165. Responses of State Superintendent Tony Evers and the Wis. Dep’t of Pub. 
Instruction to U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. Letter of August 17, 2011 (Sept. 27, 
2011). 
 166. Id. 
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Lunch Program.
167
 The agency then explained that it does not have statutory 
authority to directly oversee participating schools’ admission and treatment 
of children with disabilities beyond obtaining assurances of non-
discrimination.
168
 As such, much of the information requested by the DOJ 
was met with the same responseDPI has no authority and therefore does 
not have nor collect the requested information.
169
   
The DOJ issued its response to the investigation in a letter dated April 
9, 2013.
170
 While the letter made no findings of fact, it detailed the federal 
agency’s position that “DPI must do more to enforce the federal statutory 
and regulatory requirements that govern the treatment of students with 
disabilities who participate in the school choice program.”
171
 The letter did 
not address the complaint’s assertion that schools should be bound to 
additional requirements under Section 504 as direct recipients of federal 
funds, nor did the letter weigh in on the private/public nature of schools that 
participate. Rather it focused on the obligations of the state with regard to 
administering a public program in accordance with Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.
172
 The DOJ concentrated it analysis on the 
public nature of the voucher program and the state’s obligation under Title 
II of the ADA
173
 to ensure that “no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  
 169. The DPI informed the DOJ that it has: (a) No staff person specifically responsible 
for the participation of children with disabilities in the MPCP; (b) No policies or procedures, 
letters, emails, or other correspondence that reference MPCP compliance with Section 504 
or the ADA; (c) No letters, emails, or other documents or materials sent to MPCP schools 
regarding access or programming for children with disabilities; (d) No data collected to track 
application, enrollment, retention, outreach, disenrollment, transfer, and suspension or 
expulsion of children with disabilities in MPCP schools; (e) No data to indicate the total 
number of students with disabilities enrolled in each participating school or the disability 
categories represented; (f) No data tracking students who enroll in the MPCP and 
subsequently return to MPS or the basis for any withdrawal, either in the aggregate or 
disaggregated by disability status; (g) No DPI personnel with authority to approve publicity, 
outreach, or enrollment information produced by schools. (h) No monitoring activities for 
MPCP schools’ compliance with Section 504 and the ADA. Responses of State 
Superintendent Tony Evers, supra note 165. 
 170. See Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., 
Educ. Opportunities Sec., to Tony Evers, State Superintendent, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub. 
Instruction (Apr. 9, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ 
04_09_13_letter_to_wisconsin_dpi_0.pdf. 
 171. Id. at 1. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 2. 
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denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
174
 Specifically, the 
DOJ concluded that the DPI must:  
(1) empower students with disabilities and their parents to make 
informed decisions during the school selection process; (2) ensure that 
disability status has no unlawful adverse impact on admissions 
decisions, and (3) ensure that voucher schools do not discriminate 
against students with disabilities enrolled in the school, either by 
denying those students opportunities and benefits available to non-
disabled students, or by failing to make reasonable modifications to 




The DOJ also directed the state agency to collect accurate data on the 
participation of children with disabilities, review the accuracy of marketing 
materials, and ensure that no discrimination occurs.
176
 The DOJ letter then 
listed seven (7) specific requirements for DPI compliance (See Table 6), 
reminding the state that “[t]he private or religious status of individual 
voucher schools does not absolve DPI of its obligation to assure that 
Wisconsin’s school choice programs do not discriminate against persons 
with disabilities as required under Title II.”
177
 
The Department of Public Instruction responded to the DOJ’s 
directives in a letter dated November 25, 2013.
178
 DPI’s letter reiterated its 
response to earlier questions that it has limited statutory authority to 
oversee the private schools participating in the program.
179
 The letter then 
                                                                                                     
 174. 42 U.S.C. §12132. 
 175. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers, supra note 170.  
 176. Id. at 3. 
 177. Id. Citing Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F. 3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding ADA regulations requiring public entities to ensure non-discrimination when 
third parties are involved in delivery of programs or benefits); Kerr v. Heather Gardens 
Ass’n, No. 09-409, 2010 WL 3791484, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a public entity 
must ensure non-discrimination of third parties delivering public benefits), rev’d on other 
grounds, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, 675 F.3d 
149 (2d Cir. 2012); James v. Peter Pan Transit Mgmt., Inc., No. 97-747, 1999 WL 735173, 
at *8-9 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 1999) (holding that when a public entity contracts with a third 
party, it must ensure non-discrimination under the ADA); cf, 28 C.F.R. §§35.130(b)(1)(v); 
35. 130 (b)(3). 
 178. See Letter from Janet Jenkins, Chief Legal Counsel, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub. 
Instruction, to Renee Wohlenhaus, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 25, 2013) 
available at http://watchdog.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2014/ 
04/DPI-Response-dated-November-25-2013.pdf. 
 179. Id. 
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outlined DPI’s concerns regarding DOJ’s requirements, including a request 
that the DOJ provide more detail about the ways Title II has been 
violated.
180
 The DPI also questioned whether DOJ had the authority to order 
the DPI to impose additional requirements on the private voucher schools 
and its own authority to comply with the directives giving the statutory 
limits placed on the state agency by the state legislature.
181
 Table 6 provides 
a comparison between each DOJ directive and DPI’s response to it. While 
declaring the agency’s commitment to non-discrimination, the DPI only 
promised full compliance with two of the seven directivespreparation and 
dissemination of outreach materials to families and the development of 
program guidance regarding the ADA for all participating private 
schools.
182
 It is not known whether the agency abided by any of the 
deadlines imposed by the letter.  
Table 6: Side by Side Comparison of DPI Responses to DOJ Directives 
DOJ Directive183 DPI response to Directive184 
 
Eliminate discrimination against students 
with disabilities in the MPCP and all state 
voucher programs. 
Requests the DOJ “tell the DPI what aspects of 
DPI’s legislatively circumscribed 
administration of the Choice program results in 
any violation of Title II.” 
 
Establish and publicize a complaint 
procedure for those alleging disability 
discrimination in the voucher program. 
Provide the DOJ copies of all complaints 
and their resolution by 12/15/2013 and 
6/15/2014. 
The DPI will comply, but is concerned that it 
has only has statutory authority to address 
discriminatory behavior in the admissions 
process and “limited statutory authority to 
sanction Choice schools” for any other 
discriminatory behavior. 
 
                                                                                                     
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 2–3.  
 182. Id. It should be noted that to date no guidance for participating MPCP schools or 
parents of enrolled children regarding the ADA has been made available on the MPCP 
website. 
 183. See Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., 
Educ. Opportunities Sec., to Tony Evers, State Superintendent, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub. 
Instruction (Apr. 9, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/04_09_13_ 
letter_to_wisconsin_dpi_0.pdf. 
 184. See Letter from Janet Jenkins, Chief Legal Counsel, Wis. Dep’t. of Pub. 
Instruction, to Renee Wohlenhaus, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 25, 2013) 
available at http://watchdog.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2014/04/ 
DPI-Response-dated-November-25-2013.pdf.  
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DOJ Directive183 DPI response to Directive184 
 
Collect data regarding the number of 
children with disabilities who apply, are 
accepted, are denied (by 9/30/2013), are 
suspended or expelled, and who leave each 
participating voucher school (by 6/15/2014), 
disaggregated by grade level and type of 
disability. 
The DPI will request the data, but believes it 
has no statutory authority to demand it or to 
sanction schools that fail to provide it.  “[T]he 
DPI is concerned that this requirement may 
violate the principle…that the Federal 
Government may not compel the States to 
implement…federal regulatory programs.” 
 
Conduct outreach to families of children 
with disabilities to inform them of their 
rights under program and the services 
available at participating voucher schools. 
The DPI will comply and make materials 
available on the program’s website, but 
believes it lacks the statutory authority to 
require participating schools to disseminate the 
materials. 
 
Provide monitoring and oversight to ensure 
that voucher schools do not engage in any 
discrimination on the basis of disability 
during admissions, programming, 
suspension or expulsion. 
The DPI will work with the DOJ to monitor 
whether discrimination is occurring in the 
Choice schools. “Because of the DPI’s limited 
authority regarding regulation of Choice 
schools and its even more limited authority to 
impose any kind of sanctions against Choice 
schools . . ., the DPI is concerned it lacks the 
statutory authority to review, investigate, and 
correct discriminatory expulsions.” 
 
Provide mandatory ADA training to new 
voucher schools and periodic training to 
continuing voucher schools and provide a 
copy of the all materials to the DOJ. 
 
The DPI will request the Chicago office of the 
US DOJ Office for Civil Rights provide the 
training. 
By 12/31/2013, develop program guidance 
concerning the ADA and private school 
participation in the voucher program. 
 
The DPI will work with the DOJ to develop 
the guidance. 
V.  Revisiting the Legal Issues 
The complaint brought by the ACLU/DRW and others marks the third 
significant challenge to the MPCP. Not surprisingly, like each of the 
previous disputes, it coincides with a major expansion of the program.
185
 
                                                                                                     
 185. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Wis. 1992) followed the establishment of 
Milwaukee’s voucher program. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 
1998) followed the expansion of the program to include religious schools and increase the 
number of students who could participate, and the latest challenge filed by the ACLU 
coincided with the removal of the participation cap, among other changes. 
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All three challenges call into question what it means to be a “private” 
school and how that differs from a “public” school. Furthermore, even 
though the ACLU/DRW complaint did not explicitly attempt to renew the 
previous constitutional claims considered in both Davis and Jackson, by 
arguing that the schools are “private in name only” and should be 
considered “public” schools for the purposes of their service to children 
with disabilities, they effectively invited re-analysis of those claims.   
A.  Disability Discrimination 
Given the focus of the ACLU/DRW complaint, it is necessary to 
address the allegation of disability discrimination in the MPCP first.  Both 
Section 504 and the ADA are federal laws that prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of disability, though Section 504’s reach is limited to recipients of 
federal financial assistance.
186
 The state, as a recipient of federal funds, 
must ensure compliance with Section 504. Any school that receives federal 
funds would likewise fall directly under the ambit of Section 504. In 
addition, MPCP private schools are indirectly bound by Section 504 
because of their relationship to a recipient (the state) through a state 
operated program.
187
 ADA’s Title II,
188
 which applies to “public entities,”
189
 
also mandates the state ensure non-discrimination on the basis of disability 
in all its programs and activities.
190
 Private schools must directly comply 
                                                                                                     
 186. Section 504 reads: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” (29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).  The 
purpose of the ADA is: “(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, 
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the 
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to 
invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth 
amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination 
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities” (42 U.S.C. §12101). 
 187. Supra notes 170–177 and accompanying text. 
 188. 42 U.S.C. §§12131–12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq. 
 189. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2012) (defining “public entity” as “(A) any State or local 
government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of 
a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 
and any commuter authority (as defined in section 24102(4) of Title 49).”).  
 190. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (noting that “no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied 
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with Title III of the ADA,
191
 which addresses the need for public 
accommodations to be offered on an equitable basis.
192
 In addition, similar 
to Section 504’s indirect reach, private schools that participate in the MPCP 
(a state program) fall indirectly under the state’s Title II obligations.  Both 
laws require that qualified individuals with disabilities be reasonably 
accommodated in order to avoid discrimination.
193
 Reasonable 
accommodations or modifications are measures taken to mitigate the effects 




The ACLU/DRW complaint makes allegations against both some 
participating schools and the state.
195
 The easier of the two claims to 
analyze is the allegation that the private participating schools have not 
admitted students with disabilities, discouraged their applications, or have 
failed to provide reasonable accommodations to them once enrolled. If 
proven, these claims appear to be clear violations of the private schools’ 
obligations under Section 504 and the ADA to enroll and serve those 
                                                                                                     
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”). 
 191. 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189 (2012); 34 C.F.R. 36 et seq.; See specifically 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12181 (2012) (“The following private entities are considered public accommodations for 
purposes of [Title III], . . . (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or 
postgraduate private school, or other place of education.”).  
 192. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on 
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any 
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”). 
 193. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2014) (“A public entity shall make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to 
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that 
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 
activity.”); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2014) (“A public accommodation shall make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when the modifications are necessary to 
afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals 
with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that making the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”); 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a) (2014) (“A recipient 
that provides private elementary or secondary education may not, on the basis of handicap, 
exclude a qualified handicapped person if the person can, with minor adjustments, be 
provided an appropriate education, as defined in § 104.33(b)(1), within that recipient’s 
program or activity.”). 
 194. Id. See generally  CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland School Dist., 743 F.3d 524 
(7th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Woodford County Bd. of Educ., 213 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2000); Mark 
H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 195. See  Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24. 
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students who can be reasonably accommodated in existing programs.
196
 
Interestingly, the DOJ letter did not directly address these claims.
197
 These 
allegations, however, are not unlike claims in other choice contexts where 
incidents of “counseling out” have been documented in charter schools, 
statewide open enrollment, and magnet school settings.
198
 Similar 
conclusions have put operators of those choice programs on notice that 
discrimination against children with disabilities in choice contexts must be 
corrected. In fact, administrative guidance and rulings around those choice 
environments have yielded four reasonably clear directives:
199
 
1. All publicly funded choice programs must be 
accessible to children with disabilities.
200
 
2. Parents and children can not be required to 
waive needed services in order to participate 
in the choice program.
201
 
3. A student’s right to “free appropriate public 
education” must be preserved in any choice 
program delivered in public schools.
202
 
4. States need to determine which entity (the 
sending district, receiving school or district, a 
combination, or some other entity) will serve 
as the responsible “local education agency” 
for purposes of IDEA.
203
 
                                                                                                     
 196. Supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text. 
 197. Supra note 170. 
 198. See Julie F. Mead, How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice, in 
EXPLORING THE SCHOOL CHOICE UNIVERSE: EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 39–64, at 52 
(Gary Miron, et al. eds., 2012). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Letter to Lunar, 17 IDELR 834 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Evans, 17 IDELR 836 
(OSEP 1991); Letter to Bina, 18 IDELR 582 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Bocketti, 32 IDELR 
225 (OCR 1999); Letter to Gloecker, 33 IDELR 222 (OSEP 2000). 
 201. Fallbrook Union Elementary School District, 16 IDELR 754 (OCR 1990); San 
Francisco Unified School District, 16 IDELR 824 (OCR 1990); Chattanooga Public School 
District, 20 IDELR 999 (OCR 1993).  
 202. Letter to Lunar, 17 IDELR 834 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Evans, 17 IDELR 836 
(OSEP 1991); Letter to Bina, 18 IDELR 582 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Bocketti, 32 IDELR 
225 (OCR 1999); Letter to Gloecker, 33 IDELR 222 (OSEP 2000). 
 203. San Francisco Unified School District, 16 IDELR 824 (OCR 1990); Letter to 
Bocketti, 32 IDELR 225 (OCR 1999); Letter to Gloecker, 33 IDELR 222 (OSEP 2000). 
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Of course, these directives involve public school choice options, 
whereas the MPCP program is a publicly funded private school program. 
This distinction requires a bifurcated examination when considering 
whether the program operates in nondiscriminatory manner. The direct 
actions of participating private schools are important, but equally if not 
more important is the state’s obligation to ensure that each program or 
benefit it establishes is nondiscriminatory both on its face and as 
implemented. In this instance, the state legislature must ensure that the 
public voucher program it enacts is accessible to children with disabilities 
and the DPI, as the agency responsible for overseeing the program, must 
ensure that that public voucher programs are implemented in a 




DPI’s November 2013 response to DOJ directives seems to neglect 
these important distinctions. Even if the schools that participate in the 
MPCP are private, the voucher program is not. The MPCP is a public 
program, which requires the state to assure non-discrimination in its 
operation.
205
 As the DOJ explained, “the State cannot, by delegating the 
education function to private voucher schools, place MPCP students beyond 
the reach of the federal laws that require Wisconsin to eliminate disability 
discrimination in its administration of public programs.”
206
 The DPI 
objected to the DOJ’s analysis, contending that the federal agency was 
likening the MPCP to contracted services.
207
 According to the DPI, that 
characterization is in error because the state does not contract with the 
schools per se, but rather merely makes the vouchers available to parents 
who decide where to use them.
208
 As the agency, concluded, “[a]bsent the 




Still, while the form of contract may differ from those defining the 
relationships in the cases cited by the DOJ,
210
 it seems disingenuous to 
argue that DPI has not entered into a contractual relationship with the 
private schools that participate in the program.  “The requisite elements of a 
                                                                                                     
 204. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers, supra note 170. 
 205. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2014) (“[T]his part applies to all services, programs, and 
activities provided or made available by public entities.”) (emphasis added). 
 206. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers, supra note 170, at 2. 
 207. Letter from Janet Jenkins to Renee Wohlenhaus, supra note 178, at 2.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Supra note 177. 
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contract include an offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual 
assent to terms . . . .”
211
 The state established a program inviting the 
participation of private schools (offer) and providing voucher funds 
(consideration). The funds are sent to the schools, not to parents. In 
exchange for the voucher funds, the schools agree to provide educational 
services to eligible students (acceptance and mutual assent). Moreover, the 
form completed by a private school to participate in the program includes 
the following language under the heading “Agreement/Signatures”: 
The Private School agrees that compliance with all the requirements in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 118.60 and/or 119.23 and Administrative Code PI 35 
constitutes a condition of receipt of funds under the above-referenced 
program, and that this notice of intent to participate is binding upon the 
school, its successors, transferees and assignees for the period during 
which the school is a participant in the program. The school assures that 
all contractors, subcontractors, subgrantees, and others with whom it 
arranges to provide services or benefits to its students in connection with 
this program are not in violation of the stated statutes, regulations, 
guidelines, and standards. In the event of failure to comply with PSCP 
[Private School Choice Program] requirements, the school understands 
that its participation in the program can be terminated.
212
 
Even if one accepts DPI’s contention that the relationship it has with private 
schools participating in the public voucher program is not technically a 
contract, it is apparent that DPI enters into a binding agreement with each 
private school that chooses to participate in the program.  
ADA regulations make clear that public entities, including states,
213
 
must ensure that “all services, programs, and activities provided or made 
available by public entities”
214
 avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability even when the benefit is made available “through contractual, 
licensing, or other arrangements.”
215
 The MPCP and other voucher 
                                                                                                     
 211. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 1 (West 2014). 
 212. Form, Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, Private Schools Choice Programs (PSCP) 
Notice of School’s Intent to Participate, 2015–16 School Year (emphasis added), available 
at http://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/ 
imce/forms/doc/fpcp-109.doc. 
 213. Supra note 189. 
 214. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2014). 
 215. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added);  Section 504 regulations 
similarly mandate that: “A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other 
arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of 
subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap, (ii) that 
have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the 
objectives of the recipient's program or activity with respect to handicapped persons, or (iii) 
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programs operated by the state are clearly public benefits made available to 
individuals through “contractual . . . or other arrangements” with the private 
schools that elect to take advantage of public funding that follows when the 
schools determine to participate in the program. 
Moreover, the state has an obligation to “make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications 
are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the 
public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”
216
 The 
data collection and information dissemination required by the DOJ seems a 
modest set of directives unlikely to “fundamentally alter the nature of the” 
publicly funded private school voucher programs it operates
217
 and which 
are “necessary to avoid discrimination” in the voucher program. Whether or 
not the state legislature has vested the DPI with the authority to oversee the 
MPCP’s inclusion of children with disabilities, the state must satisfy the 
obligations set for every public entity under the ADA.  
The state’s current construction of the program has predictably
218
 
resulted in the concentration of children with disabilities in the public 
system and has relieved the private schools against which public schools 
compete from serving a similar population. Even if one accepts for the sake 
of argument that the DPI has vastly under-estimated the number of children 
with disabilities and that the actual percentage is between 7.5% and 
14.6%,
219
 it is beyond argument that the students with disabilities that 
                                                                                                     
that perpetuate the discrimination of another recipient if both recipients are subject to 
common administrative control or are agencies of the same State.” 34 C.F.R. 
§104.4(b)(vii)(4)(2014). 
 216. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2014). 
 217. In fact, the original version of the MPCP included a requirement that the state 
superintendent annually submit to the legislature “a report comparing the academic 
achievement, daily attendance record, percentage of dropouts, percentage of pupils 
suspended and expelled and parental involvement activities of pupils attending a private 
school under this section and pupils enrolled in the school district operating under this 
chapter.” WIS. STAT. §119.23 (5)(d) (1990). This requirement, since repealed by the 
legislature, involves data quite similar to that requested by the DOJ. 1995 Wis. Act 27, 
§4007m (July 28, 1995). 
 218. See, e.g., Julie K. Underwood, Choice Is Not a Panacea, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 599, 
607 (1992) (“If a voucher program does not take this into consideration, two things will 
happen. First, the schools will become segregated in that few handicapped or at-risk students 
will be served in the private Choice schools. Secondly, the costs for the resident public 
school district will increase as the children in need of expensive programs remain in the 
public schools.”). 
 219. Patrick J. Wolf, John F. Witte, & David Fleming, REPORT 35: SPECIAL EDUCATION 
AND THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, SCHOOL CHOICE DEMONSTRATION 
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require additional programming in order to succeed, including children with 
the most severe needs requiring the costliest special education services, are 
foreclosed from participation in a public program, the MPCP.
220
 As such, a 
reasonable conclusion is that the state of Wisconsin has conditioned a 
public benefit on disability status for more than 20 years without ever 
taking active steps to ensure its non-discrimination obligations under the 
law.  
In fact, the only form of non-discrimination explicitly incorporated in 
the statute is compliance with “42 U.S.C. 2000d”
221
 or Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 which mandates that no one on the basis of “race, color, 
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”
222
 The MPCP regulations likewise 
make no mention of disabilities or avoiding disability discrimination.
223
 A 
“frequently asked questions” document does address the question of 
whether a private school is “required to enroll a child with special needs in 
                                                                                                     
PROJECT, at i (2012). Of note, there are two problems with these estimates.  First, they are 
just that—estimates—while the DPI figures are based on actual numbers of students with 
Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) found eligible under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 
(2012). Secondly, the increased estimates are based on estimates of children with disabilities 
made by private school administrators and parents. As such, they include all children who 
have a disability, not just those whose disabilities are such that special education is needed in 
order for an appropriate education to result. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012) (noting the 
standard for eligibility under IDEA); 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (2014). In essence, every public 
school has three types of children with disabilities: (category 1) those children with some 
mental or physical impairment that may limit, but does not substantially limit any major life 
activity; (category 2) those children with some mental or physical impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity and makes them eligible for protection from 
discrimination under Section 504 (29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (2014)) and 
the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2014)); and (category 3) 
those children with some mental or physical impairment that adversely affects educational 
performance such that special education is needed, making them eligible under the IDEA (20 
U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (2014)). The estimates of 7.5–14.6% 
children with disabilities in MPCP schools uses an estimation that combines all three 
categories, while the MPS figure of 19.5% children with disabilities is comprised only of 
those children eligible under IDEA (category 3).  
 220. Recall that private schools need not provide any special education and related 
services and only need to make reasonable accommodations to existing programs. See supra 
notes  191–194 and accompanying text. 
 221. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(4) (2014). 
 222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
 223. WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI ch. 35 (2014). 
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the Choice program, and to provide the child with whatever services are 
required to allow the child to learn,”
224
 providing the response that:  
A private school may not discriminate against a child with special 
educational needs during the admissions process for the Choice 
program. However, as a private school, a Choice school is required to 
offer only those services to assist students with special needs that it can 
provide with minor adjustments. Parents should contact the Choice 
school during the admission process about the services the school is able 
to provide for their child. Parents should also contact the school district 
in which the private school is located for more information on the 
services the school district provides to children with special needs who 
are enrolled in the public schools and the lesser services that the school 




Participating schools are also asked to sign a form acknowledging receipt of 
a list of student rights.
226
 As explained in the cover letter accompanying the 
form, the document  
contains an acknowledgement at the bottom by the [private school’s] 
choice administrator that the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) has 
advised you of Judge Steingass’ ruling in 1990
227
 of certain individual 
rights applicable within MPCP schools. It was agreed to at the 
Legislature’s Joint Committee on Administrative Rules meeting held 
                                                                                                     
 224. WIS. DEP’T  OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 22. 
 225. Id. The last part of the answer provided refers to the “equitable participation” 
provision of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130–144.  Those 
provisions require the “local educational agency” in which the private school is located to 
provide services to children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in those schools. The 
IDEA requires a proportional amount of federal funds to be spent on students in private 
schools, though children and their parents do not have an entitlement to the same level or 
types of services they would if they remained enrolled in a public school. See U.S. Dep’t.of 
Educ., Office of Special Educ. Programs, IDEA Regulations: Children Enrolled by Their 
Parents in Private Schools, IDEA.ed.gov, http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2C 
dynamic%2CTopicalBrief%2C5%2C (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 226. Letter from Tony Evers, State Superintendent, Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, to 
Individuals and Organizations Interested in Participating in the Private School Choice 
Programs (PSCP) (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/ 
imce/sms/pdf/pscp_ltr_stdnt_rights.pdf. 
 227. Recall that Judge Susan R. Steingass presided over the Dane County Circuit Court 
when it heard the first challenge to the MPCP in Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane 
Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990). Judge Steingass’ opinion is the only one to address the issue of special 
education in voucher schools, rejecting a regulation that would have required voucher 
schools to fully implement federal special education law. Supra notes 121-28 and 
accompanying text. 
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July 30, 1998, that in exchange for the DPI’s removal of the student 
rights list from the administrative rule, the [private school’s] choice 
administrator would sign the enclosed letter of acknowledgement.
228
  
That list includes a notice about Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
229
 
but nothing regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act and expressly 
states that the letter “is not to be construed as an agreement between DPI 
and the school or as an admission that the student rights provisions attached 
hereto apply to private schools participating in the choice program.”
230
 
Accordingly, the state legislature has elected not to address disability 
discrimination in the statute neither at its inception nor through twenty 
subsequent revisions and in addition has purposefully acted to prohibit the 
DPI from doing so by regulation.
231
 In essence, the state has failed as a 
design principle to address the treatment of children with disabilities in the 




                                                                                                     
 228. Letter from Tony Evers to Individuals and Organizations Interested in 
Participating in the Private School Choice Programs (PSCP), supra note 226. 
 229. Id. (“Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 794 et. 
seq., which prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs and activities. To 
comply with Section 504, the Department of Public Instruction must assure that no qualified 
handicapped persons are excluded from its programs; and must assure that all handicapped 
students in funded placements have opportunity for a free appropriate education.”). 
 230. Id. 
 231. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether or not the legislature’s 
omission of provisions addressing students with disabilities in the MPCP and its active role 
taken in ensuring that the regulations likewise omit any rule outlining participating private 
schools’ obligations demonstrates intent to discriminate on the basis of disability.  
 232. ADA regulations make clear that: “A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, 
or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the 
basis of disability -- (i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to 
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service; (ii) Afford a qualified individual 
with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service 
that is not equal to that afforded others; (iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability 
with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to 
obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as 
that provided to others” (28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(1)) (emphasis added). Similarly, Section 504 
dictates that: “In providing health, welfare, or other social services or benefits, a recipient 
may not, on the basis of handicap: (1) Deny a qualified handicapped person these benefits or 
services; (2) Afford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to receive benefits or 
services that is not equal to that offered nonhandicapped persons; (3) Provide a qualified 
handicapped person with benefits or services that are not as effective (as defined in 
104.4(b)) as the benefits or services provided to others; (4) Provide benefits or services in a 
manner that limits or has the effect of limiting the participation of qualified handicapped 
persons” (34 C.F.R. 104.52)(emphasis added). 
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In fact, it could be argued that DOJ’s directives do not go far enough 
to ensure that children with disabilities may participate in the public 
program the state has created. The requirements sketched out in the DOJ 
letter would only require the addition of a complaint procedure, 
distribution of information to parents, and data collection by the state 
agency.
233
  DOJ’s letter does not address the underlying structure of the 
program or the barriers to voucher program participation facing children 
with disabilities.
234
 In this case, the state designed the MPCP
235
 with the 
full knowledge that children with disabilities encounter substantive 
differences should they and their parents wish to avail themselves of the 
public voucher benefit, even if no private school actively engages in 
discriminatory behavior.
236
 Private schools simply do not offer the 
services many children with disabilities require in order to learn and only 
need to offer accommodations accomplished through “minor adjustments” 
to existing programs.
237
 While it is true that the initial enactment of the 
MPCP predated the ADA,
238
 the state has always been fully bound by 
similar obligations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
239
 Even 
so, the state has never addressed how the MPCP would be accessible to all 
children regardless of disability, relying always on the private 
school/public school distinction and the differential obligations each has 
under federal disability law
240
 as the justification for why students with 
                                                                                                     
 233. Letter from Anurima Bhargava et al. to Tony Evers,, supra note 170, at 2.  
 234. Id. 
 235. The state also designed the two subsequent voucher programs operating in Racine 
and statewide. See supra note 11. 
 236. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990). 
 237. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 22.  
 238. The MPCP became effective on May 11, 1990 (1989 WISCONSIN ACT 336, § 228 
(MAY 11, 1990). The Dane County Circuit Court issued the first ruling in Davis v. Grover on 
August 10, 1990 (Davis v. Grover, 464 N.W.2d 220, at n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)), only 15 
days after the ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-336).  However, 
at the time of both the enactment and the initial legal challenge against the MPCP, Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applied and likewise bound the state to ensure that all 
its benefits were available to individuals with disabilities on a nondiscriminatory basis. See 
also Julie F. Mead, Including Students With Disabilities In Parental Choice Programs: The 
Challenge Of Meaningful Choice, 100 EDUC. L. REP. 463, 482 (1995) (“Section 504 has 
been determined not to apply directly to the private schools, but indirectly through the SEA. 
Still, the state and all its agencies are fully bound by Section 504 and its prohibition against 
discrimination. . . . The state may not, in light of Section 504, enact a program which it 
knows will result in discrimination). 
 239. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990). 
 240. Contrast the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), (20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. 300 et seq.), with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
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That rationale, however, neglects the power of the state to create a 
program and assumes there is nothing the state legislature could do to make 
the program more equitably accessible to children with disabilities. In truth, 
the state legislature could enact provisions to ensure that children with 
disabilities do not have to effectively waive needed special services in order 
to exercise a voucher and thereby participate in a state offered public 
benefit. For example, the legislature could make delivery of special 
education and related services a condition of private school participation or 
require an existing educational agency (e.g., the Cooperative Educational 
Service Agency
242
 that services that jurisdiction) to provide special 
education services for affected students. There may be other solutions.  It is 
disingenuous, however, to suggest that the state is powerless to address 
special education needs in a discretionary voucher program of its own 
design. “Just as the state legislatures in the 1960s could not establish 
programs to provide public subsidies to private schools that discriminated 
on the basis of race and then claim that they had taken no part in the 
discrimination,
243
 so, too, the Wisconsin legislature cannot enact a program 
that by design provides no or very limited access to children with 
disabilities and claim it carries no responsibility for their exclusion.”
244
 For 
the MPCP to be operated in an equitable fashion, Wisconsin, whether 
                                                                                                     
(42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134; 28 C.F.R. 35 et seq. In general, under the IDEA public schools 
must provide whatever special education and related services an eligible child with a 
disability needs to receive a free appropriate public education (regardless of cost), while 
private schools need only make reasonable accommodations to existing programming for 
any child with a disability. For a full explanation of the IDEA’s legal requirements, see 
DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER AND CYNTHIA M. HERR, NAVIGATING SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND 
POLICY (2012). 
 241. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. 1990).  
 242. See WIS. STAT. § 116.01 (2010) (“The cooperative educational service agencies 
are designed to serve educational needs in all areas of Wisconsin by serving as a link both 
between school districts and between school districts and the state. Cooperative educational 
service agencies may provide leadership, coordination, and education services to school 
districts, University of Wisconsin System institutions, and technical colleges. Cooperative 
educational service agencies may facilitate communication and cooperation among all 
public, private, and tribal schools, and all public and private agencies and organizations, that 
provide services to pupils.”); see also Wis. Cooperative Educ. Service Agencies (CESAs), 
http://www.cesawi.org/ (noting that there are twelve (12) cooperative educational service 
agencies (CESAs) in the state of Wisconsin). 
 243. See e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 232 
(1964). 
 244. Mead, supra note 127, at 482–83. 
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through the legislature or the DPI, must do more to ensure that children 
with disabilities have substantive access to the voucher program.  
B.  Education Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution 
Interestingly, the limitations on the participation of children with 
disabilities in the MPCP may also have implications for renewed charges 
under the Wisconsin Constitution. As discussed earlier, the Education 
Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution requires that the legislature provide a 
system of “district schools . . . as nearly uniform as practicable.”
245
 
However, the argument that voucher funding has transformed private 
schools into a new form of “district” school that was rejected in both Davis 
and Jackson is not likely to fare any better in 2015. The contemporary legal 
question would not be whether the MPCP schools are sufficiently like 
public schools, but rather whether the state’s commitment to and substantial 
expansion of the MPCP have compromised the state’s ability to fulfill its 
primary constitutional obligation to establish and fund district schools such 
that they are as “nearly uniform as practicable.” To paraphrase the Davis 
court: Does the state’s expansion and funding of the MPCP result in 
deprivations to MPS and other public school districts such that the 
legislature effectively denies students “the opportunity to receive the basic 
education in the public school system”?
246
 Or put it another way, at what 
point does the state’s funding of private education subvert its constitutional 
obligation to provide adequately for public education? 
In Vincent v. Voight, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the 
state’s children enjoy a fundamental right to an education.
247
 As the Court 
explained:  
We further hold that Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an 
equal opportunity for a sound basic education. An equal opportunity for 
a sound basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as 
citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally. The 
legislature has articulated a standard for equal opportunity for a sound 
basic education in Wis. Stat. §§ 118.30(lg)(a) and 121.02(L) (1997-98) 
as the opportunity for students to be proficient in mathematics, science, 
reading and writing, geography, and history, and for them to receive 
instruction in the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, 
                                                                                                     
 245. WISC. CONST., art. X, § 3.  
 246. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (Wis. 1992). 
 247. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000).  
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health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance with 
their age and aptitude.  An equal opportunity for a sound basic education 
acknowledges that students and districts are not fungible and takes into 
account districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, 




Accordingly, in addition to establishing the fundamentality of the right to 
an education, the Vincent Court set a standard to determine whether the 
legislature has met its obligation under the Education Clause. To meet the 
standard, the state must provide: (1) opportunity for proficiency in the core 
subjects of mathematics, science, reading and writing, geography, and 
history; (2) opportunity for instruction in the non-core subjects of art and 
music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education and 
foreign language; and (3) sufficient resources to address the educational 
needs of special student populations.
249
 
The expansion of the MPCP and the addition of voucher programs in 
Racine and statewide
250
 coincide with deep budget cuts to state funding for 
public school districts. The legislature cut a total of $792 million of state 
aid to school districts and also reduced local districts’ taxing authority by 
$1.6 billion over a two-year period.
251
 In fact, a recent analysis 
demonstrates that the state legislature now spends 15.3% less on support to 
local school districts when comparing fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2008.
 
252
 This decrease amounts to $1038 less state support per pupil.
253
 As a 
result of reduced resources, school districts cut 2,312 teaching positions in 
public schools across the state for 2011-2012 alone.
254
  
                                                                                                     
 248. Id. at 396. 
 249. Id.; see also WILLIAM MATHIS, RESEARCH-BASED OPTIONS FOR EDUCATION 
POLICYMAKING: EFFECTIVE SCHOOL EXPENDITURES, 3 NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR. (Feb. 
2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/pb-options-6-moneymatters.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 
2013) (estimating that “[e]conomically disadvantaged children need approximately 40%-
100% more funding per child. English language learners need 76% to 118% more.”). 
 250. Supra note 11. 
 251. 2011 Wis. Act 32, § 2539 (June 30, 2011);  see also James Shaw & Carolyn 
Kelley, Making Matters Worse: the Impact of Reducing State Funding and Expanding 
School Choice on Student Poverty and Achievement Gaps in Wisconsin, Paper presented to 
the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n. (2013).  
 252. Michael Leachman & Chris Mai, Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before 
the Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4011. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Dep’t. of Pub. Instruction, Official Report Shows Cuts to School Staff for 2011-
2012 school year, (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://news.dpi.wi.gov/sites/ 
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An analysis of the effects of the 2011 budget cuts details the 
differential effects of the enacted changes to the school finance system.
255
 
The report compares the effects of the cuts between high poverty districts 
and low poverty districts, finding that those districts with concentrations of 
poverty received deeper cuts than did districts with low poverty.
256
 Not 
surprisingly, those districts saw the greatest staff reductions.
257
 As the 
authors concluded:   
Analysis of the fiscal impact of state budget cuts on high and low-
poverty districts suggests that a simple reduction in the state budget has 
a significant adverse impact on vertical equity, as the highest need 
students, teachers, districts and taxpayers bear the largest share of the 
cuts. The fiscal burdens of a weak economy tend to adversely impact 
high poverty districts to begin with, but these effects are compounded by 
increases in tax burden in the highest poverty districts. Policies that 
promote choice often target the same high-poverty districts and further 




Even before the 2011 budget cuts, a study of the state’s school finance 
system concluded “there is sufficient evidence such that a judge could find 
that the finance system is unconstitutional with respect to its non-core 
obligations
259
 . . . that revenue controls (along with insufficient categorical 
aid) cause this problem in the non-core areas.”
260
 Moreover, the study 
concluded that school districts, like Milwaukee, with concentrations of the 
student subgroups of “disabled students, economically disadvantaged 
students, and students with limited English language skills” identified by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Vincent, had not been provided with 
                                                                                                     
default/files/imce/ eis/pdf/dpinr2012_58%20Annual%20Staff%20Report%20release.pdf. 
 255. Shaw & Kelley, supra note 251.  
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id.; see also SCOTT WITTKOPF, FORWARD INSTITUTE, WISCONSIN BUDGET POLICY 
AND POVERTY IN EDUCATION: A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL FUNDING ON 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (May 2013), http://forwardinstitute.files.wordpress.com/ 
2013/05/wisconsin-budget-policy-and-poverty-in-education-2013.pdf. 
 259. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000) (listing non-core 
subjects as “arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education 
and foreign language”). 
 260. Mark A. Paige, The Funding of Public Schools in Wisconsin: Applying the 
Vincent Standard to Assess the Finance System's Constitutionality, at x-xi (2011) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with Memorial 
Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison). 
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These analyses suggest that expansions to the voucher program
262
 in 
tandem with severe budget cuts may provide the evidence needed to argue 
that the voucher program violates the state constitution’s Education Clause 
because financial support for the program has undercut adequate funding 
for the constitutionally mandated support of a system of district schools as 
nearly uniform as practicable.  
The concentration of children with disabilities in the public system 
may likewise weigh in any uniformity calculus. If the MPCP does not serve 
comparable numbers and types of children with disabilities thus resulting in 
the effective segregation of children with disabilities in the public system, 
has the state constructively structured a district (MPS) that is no longer 
uniform in comparison to other districts? Recall that more than 19% of the 
MPS student population has been identified as requiring special education 
and related services.
263
 One would expect the incidence of children with 
disabilities to be approximately 12% of the student population.
264
 As 
recognized by the Vincent Court, high concentrations of children with 
disabilities will likely compromise the ability of local taxpayers to fund the 
education of children in the districts that serve them.
265
 First, districts have 
to fund the costs of special education and related services regardless of the 
expense.
266
 Although federal dollars flow through to school districts under 
the IDEA, federal funds only support about 16% of the excess costs 
associated with special programming.
267
 The state also provides some 
                                                                                                     
 261. Id. 
 262. Supra Parts II & III. 
 263. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction to the 
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., supra note 14. 
 264. See e.g., Latest U.S. Disability Statistics and Facts (July 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/statistics/census-figures.php. 
 265. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000). 
 266. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A); see also Cedar Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 
66, 77–78 (1999) (discussing the IDEA and cost); see also Letter from Nat’l. School Boards 
Ass’n. to U.S. H.R. Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Services (July 24, 2013), 
available at http://www.nsba.org/sites/default/files/reports/07.24.2013%20-%20FY14%20 
Labor%20HHS%20Ed%20Approps%20bill_0.pdf. 
 267. Nat’l School Boards Ass’n, Issue Brief: Federal Funding for Education, at 2 (Feb. 
2014) available at http://www.nsba.org/Advocacy/Key-Issues/FederalFunding/NSBA-Issue-
Brief-Federal-Funding-for-Education.pdf) (noting that Congress has never appropriated 
funds commensurate with the level authorized by the IDEA. Recent estimates put the 
proportion at less than 16% of the costs of funding the special education and related services 
required by the IDEA.); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2)(B)(ii)(2004)(authorizing Congress 
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categorical funds for the same purpose,
268
 but reimburses school districts 
for less than 30% of the costs.
269
 Local school districts, then, must make up 
any of the costs not borne by state and federal funding and bear the 
predominant responsibility for funding special education.  As such, the 
struggle to adequately fund special programming may compromise the 
efficacy of those programs and make it more difficult for MPS to meet its 
obligations to provide each child with a disability a free appropriate public 
education as required by the IDEA.
270
 Likewise, the education of children 
without disabilities may be compromised by the necessity to divert general 
funds to meet the costly needs of the special education programming.
271
 
Consequently, a school district with a high concentration of children with 
disabilities—made so because a voucher program has produced a student 
population that does not reflect expected proportions of children with 
disabilities—is hobbled by the legislature’s design and support of the 
MPCP. Undoubtedly, that struggle will negatively affect the “the character 
of instruction . . . [and] the training that these schools should give to the 
future citizens of Wisconsin”
272
 rendering it no longer uniform as required 
by Wisconsin’s Education Clause. 
C.  Public Purpose Doctrine 
Similarly, re-analysis of the MPCP under the public purpose doctrine 
raises some interesting questions. Recall that the Jackson Court determined 
that MPCP satisfied the public purpose doctrine because participating 
private schools are subject to standards set by statute, the MPCP requires 
                                                                                                     
to appropriate 40% of “the average per-pupil expenditure in public elementary and schools 
in the United States.”). 
 268. WIS. STAT. Ch. 121; see also Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Informational 
Paper 24: State Aid to School Districts (Jan. 2013) available at http://legis. 
wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2013/24State%20Aid%20to 
%20School%20Districts.pdf (discussing Wisconsin’s school finance system). 
 269. See Wisc. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, Special Education and School-Age Parents 
Aid, available at http://sfs.dpi.wi.gov/sfs_speced  (reporting that the Wisconsin Department 
of Public Instruction will reimburse school districts 27.47% of special education costs for 
2012–2013 and 26.5% of special education costs for 2013–2014). 
 270. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2012). 
 271. See Letter from Letter from Nat’l. School Boards Ass’n. to U.S. H.R. Subcomm. 
on Labor, Health & Human Services, supra note 266. 
 272. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 409 (Wis. 2000) (quoting an earlier 
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financial audits and a further review by the Legislative Audit Bureau and 
program is “subject to the additional checks inherent in the notion of school 
choice.”
273
 The current MPCP has a much broader scope and participation 





 but the state has also enacted provisions strengthening the 
oversight of the program, largely through increasing the requirements 
private schools have to satisfy as a condition for participation in the 
program.
276
 State law definitions of private school remain unchanged,
277
 but 
participating schools must satisfy additional requirements regarding 
curriculum, assessment and discipline.
278
 These facts suggest that a court 
may find that the program continues to satisfy the public purpose doctrine if 
the public purpose served is broadly described as “education.”  
However, there have been changes that a court may find persuasive in 
support of the opposite conclusion. We now have research to suggest that 
parental choices do not necessarily coincide with better educational 
environments,
279
 and that the “rational market” is more myth than reality,
280
 
undercutting the presumption that choice serves accountability. Moreover, 
elements of the statute directing requirements for program evaluation the 
Davis and Jackson Courts referenced as evidence that the program served a 
public purpose
281
 have since been repealed.
282
  In addition, accountability 
demands on public education have increased substantially since the last 
time the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the issue. The demands of 
the federal No Child Left Behind Act
283
 have resulted in all Wisconsin 
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PRIVATE IN NAME ONLY 377 
public schools being assessed yearly for performance both in the aggregate 
and disaggregated by gender, race, and disability.
284
 What counts as 
accountability for public investments in education is quite different from 
the expectations of the 1990s and may weigh into any consideration of 
“public purpose.” Finally, one telling omission from the invigorated 
authority of the state superintendent and DPI is the power to demand 
improvement or bar participation of low performing MPCP schools. As 
long as the MPCP private school meets 1 of the 4 standards of its choice, is 
fiscally solvent, and maintains a safe and healthy facility, DPI has no 
authority to address instructional quality issues.
285
  This lack of legislated 
authority exists by design as the legislature has purposefully limited the 
agency’s authority over the program. DPI’s statutorily limited authority 
stands in stark contrast to the obligations the agency has if a public school 
(traditional, magnet, or charter) demonstrates performance problems.
286
 Is 
the public purpose of “education” met, if data shows the programming 
offered does not result in students’ proficiency in basic skills?
287
 At what 
point does this lack of similar oversight of the private voucher schools 
suggest that the public purpose is no longer met? 
While a reviewing court may still find sufficient evidence of a “public 
purpose” of the voucher program when viewed in isolation, a different 
result may occur when viewed in light of contemporaneous cuts to public 
school districts. During the same period the state legislature enacted 
legislation to grow the voucher program, it took action to cut support for 
public school districts.
288
 Accordingly, a court may conclude that the public 
purpose of a private school voucher program is lost at the point that the 
program can be shown to interfere with the state’s obligations under the 
Education Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.
289
 Likewise, returning to 
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the apparent segregative effect of the voucher program as regards children 
with disabilities, if legislative support for the program substantially disrupts 
the uniform character of the public school system, then it may be found to 
subvert rather than serve a public purpose.
290
 
VI.  Conclusion 
As this analysis shows, the MPCP has evolved in size, scope, and 
expense. A majority of the private participating schools are dependent on 
the state funds that accompany the vouchers used by more than 80% of 
their student population. While the program has changed in many 
substantive ways, no changes have affected how children with disabilities 
may participate or the authority of the Department of Public Instruction to 
oversee instructional quality.  
Current enrollment demographics show that children with disabilities 
have little access to the MPCP, resulting in a higher than expected 
concentration of children with disabilities in Milwaukee’s public schools 
and the commensurate responsibility to provide the special education 
services they need. That pattern led to a complaint and subsequent 
investigation by the United States Department of Justice. The DOJ directed 
the state to engage in more rigorous oversight in order to ensure that the 
program satisfies the dictates of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Those 
directives have been met with resistance by the DPI, continuing the 
controversy of whether the program operates free from discrimination on 
the basis of disability.  
The facts of legislative program design, delivery, and oversight 
suggest that should the complainants desire to push forward, a reasonable 
case can be made that the program violates the non-discrimination 
requirements of federal law. The same pattern, when viewed in light of the 
severe budget cuts visited on public school districts, also indicates that the 
program may be vulnerable to challenge under the Education Clause and 
public purpose doctrine of the state Constitution as the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has previously held that the voucher program is permissible only so 
long as the legislature first satisfies its obligations to adequately fund public 
schools.   
However, should claimants successfully litigate such allegations, any 
infirmities would likely be cured by subsequent legislative action. Issues 
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regarding the accessibility of the program for children with disabilities 
could be corrected by establishing a means to provide them with special 
education and related services comparable to their peers in the public 
system and providing DPI the statutory authority to ensure the program 
operates in a non-discriminatory manner. A finding that the program 
violates the state constitution because the state has unconstitutionally 
eroded its support for a “system of district schools as nearly uniform as 
practicable”
291
 or because it fails to sufficiently serve a public purpose 
would likely be addressed by restoring public funding to public schools 
rather than dismantling the private school voucher program. Such a result 
would be ironic, indeed, as the private school program would only be 
constitutionally permissible once sufficient reinvestment in the public 
system occurred. In essence, the state would then be supporting two 
systems of educationone public and one private, though arguably private 
in name only. 
Distinctions that once were clearpublic school versus private 
school—thus become blurred under the country’s oldest voucher program.  
Whether or not MPCP survives this latest legal challenge with or without 
revision, it is clear that the MPCP continues to generate controversy. The 
public–private distinction will also likely continue to attract public policy 
arguments as this first major experiment in market principles enters its next 
chapter. 
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Appendix A 




Changes and year of change 
 









as full tuition 
Schools permitted to 
charge reasonable fees and 
may charge tuition above 
voucher amount if child is 
in high school and family 
income exceeds 2.2 times 
the federal poverty level 
(2011). 
  
Cap for vouchers 
of 49% of school’s 
population 
Increased to 65% (1993) Removed cap on 
schools (1995) 
 
Meets 1 of 4 
standards: (70% of 
pupils advance 1 
grade level OR 
90% attendance 




OR 70% parental 
involvement as 
defined by private 
school) 
   




   
Meets health and 
safety standards 
Provide certificate of 






school if imminent 
harm to health and 
safety of children 
(2004) 
Applied new indoor 
environmental quality 
standards to MPCP 
schools (2009). 
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Original  
requirement 
Changes and year of change 
 
Appoint 
representative to a 
council 






Siblings may be given 
preference (1995) 
Schools must provide 
reason for rejection 
of application; 
rejection on 
permitted if capacity 
reached (2009) 




 Submit an annual financial 
audit (1995) 
Set standards for 
audits (2004). 
Must use CPA & 
follow AICPA 
standards (2011). 
Religious schools may not 
require participation in 
religious activities (1995). 
  
Provide proof of financial 
viability, fiscal practices, 
and administrator has had 
fiscal management training 
(2004). 
  
Teachers must be high 










School must be accredited 






Learning no longer 












be done by 5 private 
school organizations 
(2011). 
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Original  
requirement 
Changes and year of change 
 
Must administer nationally 
normed tests in reading, 
math, & science in 4th, 8th 








including 3rd grade 
reading test, in a 
manner similar to 
public schools and 
provide results to 
School Choice 
Demonstration 
Project through 2011 
(2009) 
Administer all state 
assessments (2013). 
Must transfer pupil records 
within 5 days when 
requested (2009) 
Maintain a student 
information system 
with unique student 
identifiers (2014). 
 
Must pay a non-refundable 
fee to participation each 
year; fees used to fund a 




Requires 1050 hours in 
direct pupil instruction in 
grades 1-6 and 1137 hours 
in grades 7-12 (2009) 
  
Provide parents 





policy, transfer credits 
policy, visitor policy 
(2009) 
  
Adopt academic standards 
that apply to public schools 
(2009) 
  
 
